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Abstract— Since the radio medium can be accessed by
anyone, authentication of users is a very important element of a
mobile network. Nowadays, in GSM/GPRS a challenge
response protocol is used to authenticate the user to the mobile
network. Similarly, in third generation mobile systems [3] a
challenge response protocol was chosen in such a way as to
achieve maximum compatibility with the current GSM security
architecture. Both authentication mechanisms use symmetric
key cryptography because of the limited processing power of the
mobile devices. However, recent research [6] has shown that
asymmetric, or public, key cryptography can be enabled
successfully in future mobile terminals. In this paper, we
propose a new adaptive authentication and key agreement
protocol (AAKA) for future mobile communication systems.
The novelty of AAKA and its main advantage over other
challenge response protocols is that can be adaptive to the
mobile environment and use symmetric and/or public key
cryptography for user and network authentication.
Index Terms —Authentication, GSM, UMTS, Key Agreement 
I. INTRODUCTION
HE GSM network authenticates the identity of the
subscriber through the use of a challenge response
protocol [5]. Authentication involves two functional entities,
the subscriber identity module (SIM) card in the mobile
station (MS), and the authentication centre (AUC) in the
network. Each subscriber is given a secret key, one copy of
which is stored in the SIM card and the other in the AUC.
An overview of the challenge response protocol is shown in
Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1.Authentication and Key Agreement in GSM 
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Upon receipt of an international mobile subscriber identity
(IMSI) from the visitor location register (VLR), the AUC
searches in the database for the corresponding subscribers
authentication key (Ki). During authentication, the AUC
generates a 128-bit random number (RAND) that it sends to
the mobile. Both the mobile and the AUC then use the
random number, in conjunction with the subscriber's secret
key and the authentication algorithm (A3), to generate a 32-
bit signed response (SRES) that is sent back to the AUC.
Note that Ki is never transmitted over the radio channel. It is
present in the subscriber's SIM, as well as the AUC, home
location register (HLR), and VLR databases. If the number
sent by the mobile is the same as the one calculated by the
AUC, the subscriber is authenticated. Otherwise, if the
number does not agree with the calculated one the connection
is terminated and an authentication failure indicated to the
MS.  
Furthermore, the SIM contains the ciphering key
generating mechanism algorithm (A8) which is used to
produce 64 bit ciphering key (Kc). The ciphering key is
computed by applying the same random number (RAND)
used in the authentication process to the ciphering key
generating algorithm (A8) with the individual subscriber
authentication key (Ki). In addition, the Kc is used to encrypt
and decrypt the data between the MS and VLR.
On the other hand, in the authentication and key
agreement mechanism described in 3G security specifications
[3], the subscriber and network authenticate each other, and
also they agree on cipher and integrity key.  
The authentication method was chosen by 3GPP in such a
way as to achieve maximum compatibility with the current
GSM security architecture and facilitate migration from GSM
to UMTS. The method is composed of a challenge/response
protocol identical to the GSM subscriber authentication and
key establishment protocol combined with a sequence
number-based one-pass protocol for network authentication
derived from [4].
The subscriber and the network share a secret key K that is
available only to the universal SIM (USIM) and the AUC in
the user's home environment (HE). In addition the USIM and
the HE keep track of sequence numbers (SQNME, SQNHE) to
support network authentication. The sequence number
SQNHE is an individual counter for each subscriber and the
sequence number SQNME denotes the highest sequence
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number the USIM has accepted.
An overview of the mechanism is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2.Authentication and Key Agreement in UMTS
When a user registers for the first time in a serving
network, or when the serving network cannot retrieve the
IMSI from the temporary MSI (TMSI) by which the user
identifies itself on the radio path, the VLR/serving GPRS
support node (SGSN) requests the user to send its permanent
identity. The user’s response contains the IMSI in cleartext.
Then, VLR/SGSN requests authentication data from the HE
by sending the IMSI to the requesting node. Upon receipt of
a request from the VLR/SGSN, the HE/HLR sends an ordered
array of n authentication vectors (the equivalent of a GSM
"triplet") to the VLR/SGSN. The authentication vectors are
ordered based on sequence number. Each authentication
vector consists of the following components: a 128-bit
random number (RAND), an expected response (XRES), a
128-bit cipher key (CK), a 128-bit integrity key (IK) and an
authentication token (AUTN). Different authentication
vectors are used for each authentication and key agreement
between the VLR/SGSN and the USIM.
When the VLR/SGSN initiates an authentication and key
agreement, it selects the next authentication vector from the
ordered array and sends the parameters RAND and AUTN to
the user. Upon receipt of RAND and AUTN the USIM first
computes the 48-bit anonymity key (AK) and retrieves the
sequence number (SQN). Then it computes XMAC and
compares with the MAC which is included in AUTN [3].
Next the USIM verifies that the received SQN is in the
correct range. Finally, the USIM checks whether AUTN can
be accepted and, if so, produces a variable in size, 4 to 16
bytes, response (RES) which is sent back to the VLR/SGSN.
The USIM also computes 128-bit CK and IK [3].  
The VLR/SGSN compares the received RES with XRES.
If they match the VLR/SGSN considers the authentication
and key agreement exchange to be successfully completed.
The established keys CK and IK will then be transferred by
the USIM and the VLR/SGSN to the entities which perform
ciphering and integrity functions. Note that USIM and
VLR/SGSN use f1, and f2 message authentication functions
and f3, f4, f5 key generating functions.   
II.ADAPTIVE AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT 
MECHANISM
The adaptive authentication and key agreement protocol
(AAKA) is a challenge/response protocol that uses symmetric
or public key cryptography to overcome security problems in
3G. These problems are related with IMSI, IMEI, and man-
in-the-middle attacks. In 3G security specifications, for
example, the IMSI is transmitted in cleartext when allocating
TMSI to the user. Furthermore, the transmission of IMEI,
which is not considered as a security parameter, is not
protected. In addition, man-in-the-middle attacks are
possible in 3G networks with disabled encryption.  
In AAKA, users and network can be authenticated using
public key encryption. Public key schemes can be enabled in
future mobile terminals based on novel methods described in
[6]. In particular, multiple crypto-processors can be used to
perform public key complex computations [6]. The crypto-
processor can be located either in a second cryptographic SIM
card (CSIM) or in the mobile terminal itself. If we consider
the network structure in Fig. 3, then authentication will
involve three functional entities; the USIM, the CSIM and the
AUC.
Fig. 3.Public Key Infrastructure in Future Mobile Networks
The subscriber and the network share a secret key K, and
two public key pairs (PME and SME, PHE and SHE). The mobile
equipment (ME), MS in 2G-2.5G, contains K, P HE and SME
stored either in the CSIM or USIM. Likewise, VLR/SGSN
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and HLR/AUC contain K, PME, PHE and SHE in their databases.
Similarly to 3G security specifications the CSIM/USIM and
the HE keep track of sequence numbers to support network
authentication. An overview of the AAKA mechanism is
shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4.Adaptive Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol Flow 
When a user registers for the first time in a serving
network, he/she will be assigned an authentication type (AT)
number. The AT defines which encryption algorithm will be
used and whether symmetric or public key encryption will be
used in AAKA. Then AT will be sent to ME when the
serving network requests user’s permanent identity. Upon
request of the IMSI, the user will respond with an encrypted,
based on AT, IMSI. When public key encryption are applied
the IMSI is first signed with ME’s secret key and then
encrypted with its public key, PHE[SME(H(IMSI)), IMSI], as
shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Encryption/Decryption in AAKA using Public Key Cryptography and
Digital Signatures
Upon receipt of the encrypted IMSI, VLR/SGSN forwards
it to HE. Then HE/AUC first decrypts the signature and then
retrieves the IMSI. Next, the HE/AuC sends an
authentication response back to the VLR/SGSN that contains
an encrypted and signed (Fig. 5) array of n authentication
vectors AV(1..n). Each authentication vector consists of the
following components: a 152-bit RAND, an XRES, a 128-bit
CK, a 128-bit IK and a 48-bit SQN. Note that RAND
contains 24 additional bits, which are used to identify AT in
the specified IMSI/TIMSI. Similarly to UMTS each
authentication vector is good for one authentication and key
agreement between the VLR/SGSN and the USIM/CSIM.
When the VLR/SGSN initiates an authentication and key
agreement, it selects the next authentication vector from the
ordered array and sends the parameters RAND and SQN
signed and encrypted to the user (Fig. 5). Upon receipt of
RAND and SQN the USIM/CSIM first retrieves the SQN and
RAND. Next the USIM/CSIM verifies that the received SQN
is in the correct range and if so, the USIM produces a
variable in size, 4 to 16 bytes, RES that is sent encrypted,
with PHE, back to the VLR/SGSN. VLR/SGSN decrypts and
compares RES with XRES to authenticate ME. Upon
authentication, the USIM/CSIM also computes 128-bit CK
and IK to protect the air interface as presented in UMTS
specifications [3].  
The VLR/SGSN compares the received RES with XRES.
If they match the VLR/SGSN considers the authentication
and key agreement exchange to be successfully completed.
The established keys CK and IK will then be used to perform
ciphering and integrity functions. Similarly to UMTS,
USIM/CSIM and VLR/SGSN use f1, and f2 message
authentication functions and f3, f4, f5 key generating
functions.   
On the other hand when symmetric key encryption is used,
the IMSI is encrypted using the f8 stream cipher and the
authentication key (AK), which is computed from P HE and K
as shown in Fig. 6. As mentioned before, upon receipt of the
IMSI, VLR/SGSN forwards it to HE/AUC which first
computes the AK and then retrieves the IMSI. Next, the
HE/AUC sends an encrypted authentication response back to
the VLR/SGSN that contains a 152-bit RAND, an XRES, a
128-bit CK, a 128-bit IK and a 48-bit SQN.  
When the VLR/SGSN initiates an authentication and key
agreement, it selects the next authentication vector from the
ordered array and sends the parameters RAND and SQN
encrypted (Fig. 6) to the user. Next, the USIM/CSIM
produces a variable in size, 4 to 16 bytes, RES which is sent
encrypted back to the VLR/SGSN. Upon receipt of the
encrypted RES, VLR/SGSN decrypts and compares the RES
with XRES to authenticate the user. The air interface then is
protected as presented in the UMTS specifications.  
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Fig. 6.Encryption/Decryption in AAKA using Symmetric Key Cryptography
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper an adaptive authentication and key
distribution protocol (AAKA) was presented that can be
applied in future mobile communication systems. AAKA is a
challenge response protocol that uses symmetric and/or public
key cryptography for user and network authentication. The
novelty of AAKA and its main advantage over other
challenge response protocols is that can be adaptive to the
mobile environment. For example, when a customer registers
for the first time in a serving network an authentication type
(AT) can be assigned based on the level of security he/she
requested. In AAKA we have defined two types of
authentication; authentication using public key encryption
and authentication using symmetric key encryption.
Authentication using public key schemes requires several
crypto-processors embedded to mobile devices for public key
complex computations. However, when a subscriber has
assigned authentication with public key encryption the
VLR/SGSN still can use symmetric encryption if the network
is overloaded at the time of AAKA. The additional
information in RAND informs VLR/SGSN whether
symmetric or public key encryption will be used in AAKA.
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